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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a certification of a juvenile for 
trial in The Third District Court, and ultimate trial and convic-
tion of said juvenile for the crime of aggravated robbery. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendant, Aaron Lee Greuber, was certified by the 
Juvenile Court to stand trial as an adult on three charges of 
aggravated robbery and one charge of criminal homicide. 
Defendant's appeal of the certification to the Utah Supreme Court 
was not heard as not being an appeal from a final order. The 
defendant was tried and convicted in the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District of Utah on two crimes or the crime of 
aggravated robbery. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
That defendant's trial and conviction in the District Court 
for the Third Judicial District of Utah be vacated for lack of 
jurisdiction as stemming from improper certification in the 
Juvenile Court, and denial of due process in defendant's right to 
appeal in such certification. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Aaron Lee Greuber, a juvenile, was identified by several 
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witnesses as being one of several boys who followed a general 
pattern of gaining access to people's homes through artifice, fur 
the purpose of robbing the individuals once entry was obtained. 
It was further alleged that in the course of such conduct, a 
firearm was utilized to support the threats of the juveniles. In 
the course of one such robbery, a victim allegedly resisted and 
was shot by one of the boys, William Ruch, resulting in the death 
of the victim. 
In hearing for certification of defendant Aaron Lee Greuber, 
it was determined that he had been in the juvenile system for 
several years, with both a stay on a boys' ranch and supervised 
probation in his home. No other alternatives for treatment has 
been attempted with this juvenile. 
POINT I 
TRIAL IN THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND 
DENIED THE APPELLANT DUE PREOCESS OF LAW. 
Appeals from final orders of the Juvenile Court are provided 
by U.C.A. §78-3a-51 (formerly, U.C.A., Section 55-10-112). The 
only question then in determining the right to appeal is whether 
the order of certification is, in fact a final order. This 
issue, while not decided at the time of defendant's appeal in 
- 2 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
June of 1977, was decided in the case of In the Interest of 
Atcheson, 575 P. 2d 181, in January of 1978. Accordingly, 
defendant's appeal from his certification should have been enter-
tained, and determination of its validity allowed prior to pro-
ceeding to trial in the District Court. The logic and basis for 
the Atcheson case will not be repeated in this argument. 
The effect, however, of failure to review certification for 
Aaron Lee Greuber was a denial of due process under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
This has created an irrevocable harm, upon certification, the 
juvenile was immediately transferred to the authority of the 
District Court and incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Jail, and 
subsequently, upon conviction, the Utah State Prision, where he 
has been exposed to the influence of adult offenders, the very 
kinds of harm that are designed to be avoided by the creation of 
the Juvenile Court and the juvenile procedures. Additionally, as 
a quick review and determination of the issues in June of 1977 
may still have allowed the Juvenile Court to provided appropriate 
treatment, the defendant now is clearly too old for treatment 
within the Juvenile System. A similar situation was involved in 
the case of Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541 (1966), in 
which a juvenile was denied appropriate safeguards in the process 
of his certificaiton. It is clear from Kent that a determination 
- 3 -
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must now be made as to whether the certification of the defendant 
was appropriate under the circumstances. If the underlying cer-
tificaiton is deemed to have been improper the conviction must be 
vacated and the defendant no longer capable of treatment as a 
juvenile, must be released. Id. at 565. 
If it is found that certification was appropriate, such cer-
tification may be upheld at this point. However, the action in 
the District Court should be vacated and the matter remanded for 
trial, or other appropriate remedies as seen fit by the District 
Court. Until the Juvenile Court has "after full investigation" 
make a determination that said certifiction would be "in the best 
interests of the child or of the public" and certitiry the child 
the District Court has no jurisdiction, U.C.A. 78-3a-25; State 
v. Musser 175 P 2d 724. From this certification, the defendant 
had a right of appeal before jurisdiction passed to the District 
Court. U.C.A. 78-3a-51; In The Interest of Atcheson, Supra. 
In the instant case the appeal of the defendant through no 
fault of his own ws not heard. Jurisdiciton in the District 
Court was improperly obtained and all proceedings in that Court 
should be vacated. 
- 4 -
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POINT II 
CERTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT, WAS INAPPROPRIATE ON THE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED. 
The Juvenile Court act establishes the purpose and general 
guideline for the operation of the Juvenile Court. It is the 
purpose of the act to attempt to balance the need to care for, 
protect and treat children, with the necessity to protect the 
community. This scale is not to be lightly tipped, and must con-
sider the interest of the community both in the prorection and 
development of its children and their potential dangers to the 
Community. U. C. A., 78-3a-1; In Interest of Salas, 520 P. 2d 
874. No place in the Juvenile Court Act does this come more into 
play than in the determination of certification of juveniles to 
stand trial as adults. The Code allows that : "If ••• after 
full investigation and hearing" the Court determines that it 
would be "contrary to the best interest of a child or of the 
public to retain jurisdiction" the juvenile may be certified to 
the District Court for trial and treatment as an adult. U .C.A. 
§78-3a-25 (formerly, 55-10-86). In dealing with this problem, 
the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, supra, 
provided guidance in the form of an appendix to its decision 
incorporating Policy Memorandum No. 7, dated November 30, 1959, 
- 5 -
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from the Federal Court. This Policy Memorandum has been substan-
tially adopted by the Utah Juvenile Court in its Rule 7 of the 
Utah State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. 
Standards, in Rule 7 can roughly be divided into three groups. 
The first three,(a) through (c), deal with the offense iteself; 
the fourth, (d), considers co-defendants who may be adults, not 
applicable in this case; and the last group, composed of (e), (f) 
and (g), deal with the background of the juvenile himself. 
Normally a juvenile will not be considered for certification 
unless the offense involved falls into the category of more 
violent and serious crime, as defined by Standards a through c. 
Certainly, the crime of aggravated robbery is considered by the 
legislature to be serious, as it assigned a five year to life 
sentence for adult offenders. U.C.A. §76-6-302; U.C.A. §76-3-203 
but that fact alone is not determinative. Standard is tempered 
by the necessity for a determination of the community need for 
certification in order to protect itself from the individual 
involved. While the evidence presented at the time of cer-
tification supported the probability of a spree of robberies by 
the boys involved, there is no indication that Aaron Lee Greuber 
was violent, or at all likely to continue similar behavior, even 
if released. The criminal homicide charge against the defendant 
- 6 -
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stems not from any violent the actions of the defendant himself, 
but from a fiction of the law where he, through involvement in 
the robbery becomes responsible for the actions of another. 
u.c.A. 76-2-202. 
There is no evidence that the robberies were committed in an 
aggressive or violent manner, as defined by the second Standard, 
even though a firearm was carried. Standards a-c then must rest 
on the inherant seriousness of the crime itself, not sufficient 
reason for certification alone. Many states employ juvenile 
systems that require the child's welfare to be considered to the 
complete exclusion of any other interest of the community. But 
even in these states that require balance, the balance is usually 
tipped toward the possible treatment of the child. For an 
excellent example see Welfare of J.E.C. v. State, 225 N.W. 2d 545 
(Minn) where the Court remanded to determine if a program could 
be created for the child, not being content with the mere state-
ment that no program for violent juvenile offender presently 
existed in the system. 
Additionally, at least one Federal Circuit Court has gone so 
far as to strongly hint that the Federal Constitution guarauntee 
treatment to juveniles in affirming a lower Court finding to that 
effort. Nelson v. Heyne, 491F2d352 (1974 7th CA). 
The Legislature would seem to support the position of the 
Minnisota court in its mandate to Liberally construe the purpose 
statement of the act, U.C.A. §78-3a-1. 
- 7 -
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If the protection of the juvenile is to be construed 
liberally the question of Aaron Lee Greuber's certification must 
be considered under Standards (e), (f) and (g). 
Standard e states: 
"The sophistication and maturity of the 
juvenile as determined by consideration of 
his home environment situation, emotional 
attitued, pattern of living and alleged 
involvement in the offense." 
The home environment of Aaron Lee Greuber was not good. In 
fact, much of the testimony recognizes the inability of the 
parents to properly reinforce appropriate behavior in this juve-
nile. See Juvenile Court Transcript pages 47,56,and 62. He does 
not seem, however, to show the sophistication one would expect of 
an individual who is operating on an adult level, rather than on 
a child level; and the testimony strongly indicated that in a 
structured situation he functions well. Transcript of Juvenile 
Court Proceeding pages 56, 59, 70,82 and 89. 
Standard f provides: 
"The record and previous history of the juve-
nile, including previous contacts with law 
enforcement agencies, Juvenile Court and 
rehabilitative resources of the juvenile 
system and the success or failure of past 
corrective efforts in the juvenile system." 
This Standard is particularly significant in that Aaron Lee 
- 8 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Greuber has had extensive contact with the juvenile system, but 
the system has not responded to Aaron Lee Greuber with any degree 
of effectiveness. Even though all analysists, psychologists and 
probation officers dealing with Aaron Lee Greuber agree that the 
worst possible result for him was continuing in his family 
environment, the system has repeatedly chosen to leave Aaron Lee 
Greuber in that very environment. In fact, the only time that he 
was removed from that environment was a stay at two boys' ranchs. 
At the first boys' ranch, Aaron adequately performed and there is 
no evidence of any failure by Aaron Lee Greuber during his period 
of treatment. When this ranch was closed, he was transferred to 
another facility. Problems apparently developed and he ran away 
twice. There is no indication of the reason or evidence that any 
attempt was made to determine what the scope and reasons for his 
running away were; he was merely released from the program and 
returned again to that disasterous home environment. 
The final Standard (g) provides: 
"The prospects for adequate protection of the 
public and the likelihood for reasonable 
rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is 
found to have committed the alleged offense) 
by the use of procedures, services and faci-
lities available under order of the juvenile 
court and whether the advantages and resour-
ces for treatment and public safety lie with 
- 9 -
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the adult criminal court, rather than the 
juvenile court." 
The record does not support an indication that Aaron Lee 
Greuber would not be responsive to rehabilitation. What it does 
support is an indication that Aaron Lee Greuber would not be 
responsive in the short period of one year. He would require 
additional time. This may lay as a proper basis for certifiction 
where a juvenile's age would cause loss of jurisdiction prior to 
the time that this type of treatment could be completed. In 
Interest of Atcheson, supra. However, in the case of Aaron Lee 
Greuber, the necessary amount of time set by the psychologists 
was available to the juvenile court. Juvenile Court Transcript 
page 80,81, 92,& 99. 
While much testimony seemed to center on the ease with which 
one could possibly escape various juvenile facilities, the eva-
luations did not seem to support the fact that given the oppor-
tunity, Aaron Lee Greuber would, in fact, escape. What they, in 
fact, supported was the idea that given a program of high stru-
ture, successful rehabilittion was feasible for this individaul. 
It was clearly agreed by the experts testifying that defendant 
would not receive adequate treatment in the adult system. 
The choice of the Juvenile Court for certificaiton can only 
be read as a choice for no treatment, not because it could not be 
- 10 -
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made available, not because it could not succeed, not because it 
was outweighed by the danger of the defendant, but because it 
would transcend a one year policy established within juvenile 
treatment facilities. Juvenile Court Transcript pages 78, 81, & 
104. As in the Welfare of J.E.C., supra, the polices of the 
juvenile treatment programs should not be allowed to dictate the 
purpose; they should, rather, respond to the needs of the indivi-
duals and society, identified by that purpose. Aaron Lee 
Greuber's denial of treatment was improper, was not supported by 
the evidences and the order of certifiction should be reversed. 
- 11 -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THIS WILL CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed via United States mail postage 
fully pre-paid to Robert B. Hansen at the Attorney's General 
Office, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, on 
this /0" f"Lday of April, 1979. 
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